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A New Industrial Policy 
for the United States? 
By Murray L. Weidenbaum 
Whittemore House Series 
CS18 
Center for the 
Study of 
American Business 
Washington University • St. Louis 
This booklet is one in a series of infoFmal talks 
cleliverecl at Whittemore House, the Faculty Club 
at Washington University. These lectures, spon-
sored by the Center for the Study of American 
Business, offer a unique meeting ground for 
academics and business executives to meet and dis-
cuss contemporary subjects of mutual concern. 
The views expressed by the guest lecturers in tihis 
series are strictly their own. 
A NEW INDUSTRIAL POLICY FOR 
THE UNITED STATES? 
by Murray L. Weidenbaum 
It is fascinating to see how Washington 
decision makers and the coterie of private 
analysts surrounding them have finally 
discovered that American industry is in trouble. 
Seeing one car maker on the ropes, the entire 
steel industry beset with sluggish markets and 
high costs, productivity stagnant and innovation 
slowing down, even the trendy set in economic 
policy has sensed that something is wrong in the 
American economy. 
Of course, many economists and business 
executives have been warning the nation for 
years that saving and investment-the keys 
to economic growth and rising living 
standards-are woefully low. Rather than 
simply acknowledging these basic but 
undramatic facts, it seems easier for all 
concerned to adopt some new buzz words and 
"in" concepts. We cynics who have an 
optimistic nature nevertheless welcome this 
attention to basic economic factors. 
Thus, we must acknowledge that "industrial 
policy" and "reindustrialization" are new and 
vague terms which have rapidly become 
fashionable in the United States. Many in 
business applaud this new concern with business 
problems, expecting-or at least hoping-that 
the result will be more incentives for saving, 
investment, and capital formation generally. 
But industrial policy, or reindustrialization, 
has also attracted another set of supporters with 
rather different viewpoints. One recent union 
publication, for example, lumps ''rebuilding our 
industrial base" with labor's desire to "stop 
plant closings." Overall, however, the situation 
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today is not a simple matter of business versus 
labor. It is much larger in scale. A prominent 
investment banker has been urging, as a major 
part of a reindustrialization effort, bringing 
back the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 
For those who don't recall or are too young, the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation was an 
ambitious corporate bail-out agency established 
in 1932 as a gigantic, government-sponsored and 
government-guaranteed investment bank. 
Thus, a highly simplified but basically 
accurate distinction among the supporters of 
industrial policy can be made between (a) those 
who want to encourage greater reliance on 
private initiative and risk-bearing, and (b) those 
who want to expand further the role of 
government in the American economy. It is sad 
to note, along these lines, tlie recent special issue 
of Business Week on "The Reindustrialization 
of America,'' which urged that ''the leaders of 
the various economic and social groups that 
compose U.S. society should agree on a program 
for reindustrialization and present that program 
to Washington." Shades of the recent, 
unsuccessful effort to foist centralized economic 
planning on the United States! 
Whatever our personal viewpoint on the 
subject may be, it seems clear that we will be 
hearing a good deal more about industrial policy 
in the months ahead. Hence, some perspective 
may be useful. 
Where We Stand 
To begin with, it is important to realize that 
we already have many government policies 
which affect industry in important ways-and 
which have in large measure contributed to the 
difficulties now being faced by the American 
economy. In the main, of course, these impacts 
are side-effects of laws designed for other 
purposes. Examples include policies to provide a 
more equitable tax structure, to reduce the 
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inequality in the distribution of income, to 
strengthen the role of the trade unions, to 
enhance the quality of life, to improve the 
physical environment, and so forth. 
Most of these policies ignore or at least take 
for granted the needs and operations of the 
private enterprise system by focusing on non-
economic, social goals. But, in the main, the 
result of these policies has tended to be in one 
direction-to weaken the basic condition of the 
manufacturing sector of the economy. This 
negative impact is most noticeable in the 
automobile and steel industries, which have been 
beset by lagging sales, rising foreign 
competition, declining profits, and numerous 
plant closings. 
This surely unintentional weakening of the 
basic structure of American industry as a result 
of government policy can readily be seen in the 
larger manufacturing companies as they shift 
increasing portions of their work force away 
from the creative and productive areas of 
business such as research and development, 
manufacturing, and marketing. This shift has 
resulted in an increase in the overhead 
functions-legal activities, accounting and 
finance, public affairs, and government 
relations. For the individual firm, this change 
may be an essential way of responding to 
pressures from government agencies and self-
styled public interest groups with noneconomic 
orientations. 
Moreover, this change is compounded by the 
metamorphosis of the traditional functions, such 
as that which can be seen in the size of 
"defensive" research as a major mission of 
industrial laboratories-which refers to 
reorienting business research efforts to please the 
regulators. Similarly, "reverse distribution" has 
become a new marketing function-which refers 
to gearing for, and on occasion carrying out, 
product recalls. As I have pointed out in my 
new book, The Future of Business Regulation, 
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the ultimate costs of these responses to 
government dictates go far beyond the 
immediate compliance expenses and extend to 
attenuation of the entrepreneurial nature of the 
American business firm. Hence, many of the 
problems which spur the current calls for 
reind ustrialization. 
By overlooking these structural responses to 
existing government policy, all that is visible in 
the short run are the pleas for bailouts, 
subsidies, and other special assistance from the 
companies that are most severely affected by the 
burdens imposed by government on American 
industry. But, on reflection, the willingness of 
government to bail out a Lockheed or a Chrysler 
is not surprising. That is the price that Congress 
is willing to pay to avoid dealing with the 
underlying industrial problems that arise from 
the existing pattern of government intervention 
in the private economy. 
Still another example of this pattern is the 
Energy Mobilization Board proposed by 
President Carter. Although Congress recently 
delayed any decision to authorize its formation, 
this new government agency was expected to cut 
through the worst of the red tape to enable 
several selected energy projects to proceed. Yet, 
as some of us have been pointing out repeatedly, 
the growing thicket of regulatory barriers makes 
it difficult to proceed with new industrial 
developments in almost any sector or region of 
the economy, and not just in the energy area. 
Given our national unwillingness to meet this 
problem head on, the preference for a ''second 
best" strategy is not surprising. But merely 
legislating a few exceptions to a bad policy is 
surely second best. 
We must realize, in the meantime, however, 
that government policy towards industry has not 
always been negative. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
we did in fact have a positive, albeit 
unintentional, type of industrial policy. Massive 
contracts from the Department of Defense, 
4 
NASA, and the Atomic Energy Commission 
helped to foster growth industries in the 
aerospace, electronics, and nuclear fields, and in 
many supporting industries. In a more general 
way, the institution of the investment tax credit 
and liberalized depreciation was a part of that 
generally positive approach. In sharp contrast, 
during the decade of the 1970s, we have 
witnessed a burst of government regulation of 
business which has been documented in detail by 
our Center for the Study of American 
Business-regulation which, in the main, has 
had seriously negative impacts on the 
performance of the American business system. 
Alternative Approaches to Industrial Policy 
There is no shortage of proposals for change 
in government policy toward American industry. 
I find it useful, however, to distinguish between 
the negative policy of bailing out losers and a 
more positive approach, geared to creating more 
winners. 
Along the lines of bailing out losers, we must 
acknowledge that there is growing interest in 
developing a comprehensive policy for 
identifying and aiding such companies. The 
concern here is to develop a "tidier" approach 
than the existing one of "quick fixes." As I 
pointed out earlier, some would like to bring 
back the old Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation, forgetting the scandals and many 
charges of favoritism that led to its demise. But, 
in retrospect, it should not surprise us that 
arbitrary power to disperse federal largesse to 
selected companies was, in fact, used arbitrarily. 
If we are determined to develop a more orderly 
way of providing government assistance to 
companies and to specific sectors of the 
economy, we have to realize that someone must 
decide which sectors "deserve" the assistance 
from government. There is no doubt in my mind 
that this path, albeit unwittingly, leads to a 
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major expansion of government power over the 
private sector of the economy. Those who are 
fond of citing the Japanese example might do 
well to consider the sadder experiences of Great 
Britain. 
Variations on this negative theme of focusing 
on the "losers" include restricting economic 
change, such as specifically dealing with the so-
called "runaway plant problem" by making it 
extremely difficult and costly to move or close 
down an industrial facility. This approach 
ignores the reasons why companies are forced to 
take such actions in the first place. So frequently 
those plants have lost their competitiveness due 
in large part to the government policies 
advocated by the same groups that now support 
legislation against runaway plants. Such 
proposals also overlook the negative signals that 
this policy would send out to any company 
considering building a new plant in a region that 
has adopted restrictive legislation (and a few 
states already have done so). 
Close cousins of this negative approach are 
proposals to "protect" various industries and 
markets from foreign competition and to inhibit 
American investments overseas. A milder 
variation is to beef up the existing program of 
adjustment assistance for employees and 
companies "adversely" affected by imports. By 
providing more benefits generously to these 
"victims" than to the unemployed generally, 
such well-meaning responses exacerbate the 
underlying economic conditions that generate the 
lay-offs because such action increases deficit 
spending and reduces the incentive for private 
initiative. 
This approach of propping up losers also 
discourages business firms from making tough 
survival decisions. Compare the recent actions of 
Chrysler in focusing on obtaining government 
aid with the earlier painful steps taken by the 
management of American Motors, which instead 
cut back its product line in a successful effort to 
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make it on its own. From the viewpoint of 
society as a whole, the negative approach locks 
resources into low productivity industries and 
areas of the economy. But perhaps we should 
not be too critical of the Chrysler management. 
After all, the company responded to a different 
set of public policy incentives than did American 
Motors Corporation. Any impartial observer of 
the automobile industry in recent years would 
conclude that there was little chance of 
government providing a general bail-out to 
American Motors. But because of its greater size 
and strategic location, the odds for such aid 
were much higher in the case of Chrysler. 
The basic alternative-the positive approach 
that I am advocating-is to create more positive 
conditions for expansion in the economy 
generally. Thus, capital and labor would be 
encouraged to shift to more productive uses. My 
basic theme here is to foster the economic 
activities that lead to more job formation and 
also enhance new international competitiveness. 
There are many ways of doing that, and many 
of them are mutually reinforcing. 
One positive alternative is to encourage 
companies to perform more research and 
development, which is the seedcorn for product 
and process innovation. Personally, I do not 
favor more government grants and contracts 
which pinpoint the specific areas to be worked 
on. Rather, I urge liberal tax credits for R&D 
which could yield a two-fold benefit. First, 
private enterprise would determine the research 
projects to be undertaken and, second, private 
enterprise likewise would continue to bear the 
bulk of the risk, depending on the precise 
percentage of the tax credit. Also, this approach 
avoids the great question that arises so often in 
government-performed and even government-
sponsored R&D-how to commercialize the 
results? 
Often, however, the main problem is not to 
develop a new business idea, but to raise the 
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capital to develop it. There is a family of 
proposals to do that effectively, but indirectly, 
by increasing the availability of capital. One 
basic way of doing this is to reduce government 
competition for the limited amount of 
investment funds generated by the private sector. 
I mean reducing the budget deficit -especially 
by cutting back those transfer payments that 
reduce the incentive to work and to save. I 
surely would not increase the government's 
demand for funds by setting up new, off -budget 
credit agencies a Ia the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation proposal. 
Cutting income tax rates generally would 
increase private saving and private consumption 
as well. The tax cuts, alternatively, could be 
targeted at increasing saving by reducing the tax 
burden on the portion of income that is 
saved-that is, in practice, by shifting the tax 
burden to current consumption. Also, tax cuts 
could promote investment. Examples include the 
10-5-3 capital recovery approach which would 
liberalize and simplify depreciation policies by 
enabling all buildings to be written off for tax 
purposes in ten years, all equipment in five, and 
cars and trucks in three. 
Simultaneously, an industrial policy geared to 
creating more winners must reduce the numerous 
government obstacles to private capital 
formation, especially in the regulatory field. 
Along these lines, it is important to reduce the 
uncertainty about future changes in regulations 
and about getting final approval by a host of 
regulatory authorities for any new project. As 
we saw so dramatically in the now cancelled 
SOHIO pipeline case, such uncertainty 
discourages investment and also increases the 
cost of capital. In this regard, it is ironic to 
contemplate the large government subsidies 
which are being made in the synthetic fuel area 
to overcome these hurdles. This phenomenon is 
akin to the government simultaneously having 
one foot on the brake and the other on the 
8 
accelerator. This may also explain why my 
favorite advice to congressional committees that 
are considering the adoption of yet another 
government program is, "Don't just stand there, 
undo something.'' 
All of the second category of responses to 
industrial policy that I have advanced boil down 
to encouraging more winners. Unfortunately, 
this approach is not a guarantee. In a truly 
dynamic, competitive economy, we do not 
know in advance where the new product 
breakthroughs will occur. And the benefits will 
not be evenly distributed. But we do know that 
society as a whole will be better off, since it is 
likely that most-but not all-industrial workers 
and employers will enjoy higher real incomes 
and living standards than they would under the 
negative approaches. Surely, the positive types 
of industrial policy are designed to enhance 
productivity, capital formation, and 
international competitiveness. The negative 
approaches are all adverse to these important 
economic goals. 
Conclusion 
The current discussion of industrial policy 
ignores the fundamental contradictions that now 
abound in government policies affecting private 
industry. The worst thing that we could do, 
however, is to shift from the much maligned, ad 
hoc approach to a tidier and better planned 
system of business bailouts. Say's Law-supply 
creates its own demand-would work with a 
vengeance. The assured supply of assistance 
would create more demands for aid. Companies 
would be more reluctant to make those difficult 
choices needed to avoid pleas for government 
aid. Unions would be reluctant to settle for less 
if the government ultimately validates pay 
increases beyond the capacity of companies to 
pay. 
As I mentioned at the start, much of the 
current talk of a comprehensive industrial policy 
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smacks of national economic planning. The 
rekindled interest in such an approach is due in 
part to the widespread use of planning 
techniques in private business. But to talk about 
"corporate planning" and "government 
planning'' in the same breath disregards the 
fundamental distinction between members of a 
society forecasting and reacting to the future, 
and the government of that society trying to 
regulate or control it. Corporate planning is 
necessarily based on attempting to persuade 
consumers to buy a firm's goods or services. In 
striking contrast, the government is sovereign, 
and its planning ultimately involves the use of its 
power to achieve the results it desires. Its 
influence is externally oriented, extending its 
sway over the entire society. 
When we look at the operation of national 
economic planning adopted by the primarily 
market-oriented, non-Communist nations, we 
find that these planning systems have tended to 
shift the focus of private enterprise even further 
away from dealing with market forces and 
consumer demands, toward reaching an 
accommodation with an ever more powerful 
government bureaucracy. 
Under an American version of centralized 
economic planning, a company might find it 
desirable to shift resources from conventional 
marketing activities to convincing the 
government to adopt more generous production 
targets for its industry. Thus there might be less 
payoff from traditional consumer market 
research than from new efforts to persuade the 
government to treat the industry more 
favorably. Such public sector ''marketing'' 
activities would be a low priority use of business 
resources from the viewpoint of society as a 
whole. Yet, given the incentive of any 
organization to grow and prosper in the 
environment it faces, this result would not be 
surprising under a system of strong national 
economic planning and centralized decision 
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making. The Chrysler loan case furnishes a 
cogent example, since the management of 
Chrysler will have to negotiate with the federal 
government not only the models to be offered, 
but also the options included on those models 
with their federal benefactors. 
Boiled down to its essence, business planning 
is part of a decentralized decision making 
process in which individual consumers make the 
ultimate choices. National planning is a 
centralized process in which the key economic 
decisions are made in the form of government 
edicts. The greatest danger of adopting a form 
of centralized economic planning under the guise 
of a comprehensive industrial policy is that it 
will-perhaps unintentionally at first, but 
inevitably as its initial results prove 
disappointing-propel the society away from 
market freedoms and toward greater 
governmental controls over individual behavior. 
A cynic might well conclude that the optimum 
amount of change in industrial policy is zero. 
That is, the positive approaches that I have 
advocated are not very likely to be adopted; the 
negative approaches that involve further 
government planning of and intervention in the 
direction of the economy will turn out to be 
more popular. But, given the alternatives, I 
remain a patient optimist, hoping that some 
modest contribution to capital formation, 
productivity, and innovation will result from the 
renewed interest in facing the nation's economic 
problems. 
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